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anonymous referee for constructive comments.Paradoxically, families who earn barely enough to survive spend vast amounts of money
on celebrations.  In the rural South Indian data' I analyze in this paper, a typical household spends
approximately seven times its annual income on a daughter's marriage - on celebrating the
wedding and on dowry transfers to the groom's family. Moreover, fifteen per cent of its
expenditures, on average, are spent on celebrating village festivals.  Poor households tend to find
such large sums of money by going severely into debt at interest rates that range from 100-300
per cent per year which leads to chronic indebtedness and, sometimes, bonded labor.  Despite the
importance of these expenditures the Economics literature has largely ignored them, perhaps
because they fall into the realm of "non-rational" behavior. However, given their pervasiveness,
and the dominant role accorded to Economics in the formulation of policy, this omission can have
serious consequences for the design of policy interventions. Money spent on celebrations is, after
all, money not spent on food, education, health, and other productive inputs.
What explains this paradox? Are celebrations wasteful? In this paper I will examine the
factors underlying expenditures on festivals and weddings with qualitative and quantitative data
from South India. In this introductory section I sketch a general conceptual model of publicly
observable events and the role they play in Indian village life. I will then illustrate this
conceptual framework by examining aspects of wedding and festival related behaviors.  While the
paper relies on fieldwork from the South Indian state of Karnataka, I believe that the analysis is
easily generalized to other parts of South Asia.  With changes in structure and context, the basic
points are perhaps also relevant to human behavior in other non-Western societies. Working
within a context with which I am relatively familiar, however, allows me to provide a more
nuanced perspective on an important aspect of the cultural economics of behavior in poor
households 2.
In rural Indian life, celebrations tend to mark important transitions:  A wedding marks the
transition of a woman from daughter to wife and is the central event in her life-cycle (Fruzzetti,
1990), festivals mark important events in the life-cycle of a village - a religious event, or a
harvest (Fuller, 1992).  They are rituals - marking events that shape identity and meaning.  They
are also, necessarily, public.  If they were private, the change in status would not be recognized
because others would not observe the ritual.  The public nature of celebrations thus provides an
l The data are from  two different  samples  in Kamataka  state.
2For  an elaboration  on this metlhodology  see Rao (1997)
2opportunity for individuals to demonstrate, to "signal 3", to the world that an important time has
arrived, an important transition completed. As public events they also provide an opportunity for
actions to be scrutinized and commented upon, and for judgements to be made.  Therefore,
celebrations can be thought of as mechanisms where ritual, social and economic status is
demonstrated, reified and often enhanced.
How do public rituals shape identity and affect preferences?  To understand this, it is
necessary to understand anthropological conceptions of how Indians define their identities and
shape their perceptions of themselves.  Louis Dumont (1970), in Homo Heirarchicus, a seminal
work in Indian anthropology, argued that Hindu Indians are fundamentally different from
Western individuals in that they see themselves within the context of the caste system as part of a
strict ritual hierarchy. Their sense of individuality is subservient to their identification with their
family, caste and village.  Marriot and Inden (1977) modified this to say that an Indian is not an
individual, as much as a "dividual.  " A dividual's identity is made up of different transferable
"substances" that they give and receive in their interactions with others.  These substances then
come together in a dynamic, negotiated, interactive manner to achieve a sense of self.  Thus,
personhood is defined entirely in terms of one's relationships to others.
In more recent work Mines (1994) takes issue with this to argue that Indians have a well-
defined sense of individuality, but that this individuality is quite different the Western prototype.
Indian individuality, according to Mines, is more exterior or civic than personal and is crucially
conditioned by how others estimate and evaluate the person. What kind of person is he? How
influential is he?  Furthermore, this "civic individuality" is determined within the context to
which the individual belongs: their caste, religion and community.  It is also spatially defined by
the "size and locality of the constituencies that form a person's social contexts."  Thus, one's
sense of self is fundamentally influenced by whom one knows and interacts with.  Mines further
argues that it is an Individuality of Inequality - i.e. people of higher status and rank have
individualities that are more strongly emphasized - individuality is graded and ranked.  Taking all
of this into consideration we see that Indians are strongly driven by status and rank, and this
status and rank is not simply a matter of individual or relative wealth but derived from the size
and influence of their familial and social networks, and the public demonstration of access to
3 I use this in the technical  sense  of transmitting  information  from  an informned  to an uninformed  agent  via a
costly  action  (Salanie,  1997)
3these networks 4. The size and quality of one's networks thus have an inherent value, what
Appadurai (1990) defines as "the prime value of sociality," and are not only a means to an end.
An Indian, therefore, while not entirely Homo Heirarachicus, is also quite different from
Homo Economicus.  What differentiates Indian individuality from the Western, more than
anything else, is a deep anxiety about "What will others think of me?" And what others think of
them is fundamentally shaped by their civic identity - How many important people do they
know?  How closely are they adhering to the behaviors expected from someone in their socio-
cultural category - i.e.: are they being "good" fathers, mothers, sons, headmen, or priests? Thus,
unlike the caricature of a "rational" individual embodied in most economic models, Indians do
not live by consumption alone but fundamentally by the perceptions of others.  This perception
shapes their identity, their sense of themselves, and their sense of other's sense of them.  Their
status and role, within the context of their caste and group, therefore drives their behavior. If they
do not satisfy the obligations assigned to them by their place within society they will be penalized
with a loss of status or rank and looked upon with less respect, perhaps even with shame.  This
does not mean that Indians are not rational, but merely that their rationality is conditioned by
structures and practices derived from their social and cultural context, just as much as it is subject
to economic motives and constraints 5.
Status and rank require constant maintenance (Goffman, 1959).  In order to participate in
social relationships, people have to know if you are a "good" individual who acts in accordance
with the your socially delimited roles.  Thus, the maintenance of rank and stature requires public
demonstrations of actions fitting the expected behaviors of your rank within your social group.
Note that the effort spent in maintaining rank does not preclude individuals from moving up.
Wealth, a prestigious job, the acquisition of a rich husband or son-in-law is desired because they
are preconditions to the acquisition of greater public regard and respect.  But in order to acquire
the higher social rank usually associated with greater assets, these attributes of mobility often
must not just be acquired but demonstrated by behavior that accords with the class of people who
possess such assets.  Otherwise, while you may achieve economic mobility, it will not translate
into a higher social rank. Non-Indians may also value rank and social status, but an Indian faces
4This  helps explain  why Westerners  upon  encountering  Indians  are often  puzzled  by their detailed
expositions  on all the important  people  they know,  or are related  to.
5 Of course  this is probably  true of human  beings  in all cultures,  with  the logic of socio-culturally  derived
incentives  changing  according  to the context  - while  the logic of economic  incentives  stays  more or less  the
same.
4powerful incentives to regularly demonstrate that status because their behavior is under constant,
intimate and structured scrutiny.
While networks have an inherent value, in the context of the extremely risky,  environment
of Indian village life the web of obligations that define the extent of one's networks are also
central elements of coping strategies against risk and poverty.  The recent Development
Economics literature has focussed on empirical investigations of informal insurance, measuring
the extent to which families are able to smooth consumption by relying on village networks (e.g.
Townsend 1994, Udry 1994). It is clear that in the absence of networks life would be
unimaginably hard.  When crops fail - orjobs  are lost - or the main wage-earner dies (all quite
routine events in the harsh reality of rural life) one relies on one's friends and relatives to cope.
The greater the level of respect and regard your friends and relatives have of you, the easier it is
for you to ask for their help.  Networks, however, are useful not only for unanticipated shocks but
also for more everyday forms of serious but predictable problems.  Households with better
connections may be able to get access to better jobs (Collier and Garg 1998), or find ways of
getting lower prices for food, or they may be able to get better information on potential marriage
partners for their children. Therefore, respect and regard do not merely have direct utility, they
are also central elements in poverty alleviation strategies.  What others think of you is thus not
important just for its own sake --  it can mean the difference between life and death.
Given this, celebrations, which are a time of intense public scrutiny, become arenas where
reputations are managed and enhanced.  Life-cycle events become theatres where public
reputations are maintained, and stadiums where people compete in games of status competition,
going beyond their role as markers of life-cycle events.  The rules of the game are determined by
kinship systems, ritual calendars, the distribution of wealth and caste, and other structural
"endowments" that are slow to change and therefore can be considered as exogenous constraints
in the short term.  These structures determine the criteria by which people are judged by
providing rules for what is considered appropriate behavior.  They are part of the capability set
(Sen,  1988) available for individuals and families to maximize their preferences.  Thus, culturally
determined preferences and constraints interact with economic motives to create powerful
incentives for expenditures on public celebrations, particularly for individuals seeking social
mobility.
The format of the rest of the paper is as follows: I present an investigation of wedding
celebrations in Section 2,  followed by an analysis of festivals in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes
the paper and presents some policy implications.
52. On Wedding Celebrations6:
Wedding celebrations in rural India can seem extremely lavish to an outsider, especially
in contrast to the extreme poverty of rural Indian life, with large numbers of people invited for
feasts and ceremonies that can go on for several days.  Many weddings seem less influenced by
norms in the village than by pattems in cities, and celebrations of poor families imitate the more
extravagant patterns common in richer families. Take the case of a wedding of a small
agriculturist with two acres of land that I observed:  His teenage daughter was marrying a young
man who had finished his BA and had ajob  as a low- level clerk in the city.  The groom was
dressed in a crisp gray suit, the bride in a silk saree.  A large number of guests, including a
(minor) local politician had been invited, and the newlyweds were driven away at the end of the
ceremony in a large white Ambassador car. When asked why he had spent so much money on a
wedding that was obviously well beyond his means, the father said that his daughter had married
into a "good family" (the groom's father was a relatively wealthy landowner from another
village), and he wanted to have a "show."
Thus, wedding celebrations have a lot to do with social status and prestige.  Mobility
within a village is often achieved by imitating the behaviors of families of higher social orders
(Srinivas, 1989).  For the parents of a daughter in particular, a marriage is potentially the most
important source of mobility since marrying into a "good family" can greatly enhance how a
family is viewed by its peers, and a prestigious match is an occasion for great celebration and
status displays.  This may explain why some weddings are particularly lavish.  When a family
marries into a rich family it is in their interest to demonstrate this to the rest of the village,
particularly if the rest of the village does not know the new in-laws. The most effective way of
signaling a family's newfound affinity-derived status is to have as lavish a wedding as they can
possibly afford.  On the flip side, if a family marries a poor local family - well known to
everyone in the village - this may also be an occasion for celebration, but lavish displays are no
longer necessary since not much can be gained by signaling.
To better understand the nature of marriage expenditures in India, it might help to outline
the basic nature of Indian marriage "markets"':
6This  section  is culled  from  Bloch,  Rao and Desai  (1999).
7 Some of these features have become less restrictive in educated urban circles, but they continue to be a
defining aspect of village life.
61)  Marriage is restricted to endogamous groups, i.e.: people are only permitted to marry within a
well-defined set of families who make up their sub-caste.
2)  They are patrilocal - brides leave their parents' home to live with their husbands. Marriages
are arranged for both grooms and brides by their parents, and the preferences of the parents
usually drive all the choices and arrangements.
3)  Marriage is considered final and, while there are cases of separation, divorce is not an option.
4)  The burden of celebrating a marriage almost always falls on the parents of the bride.
There is a considerable amount of variation between sub-castes in their marriage and kinship
patterns (Karve, 1965). While most prohibit marriage outside the sub-caste, the size of the group
can vary a great deal.  Some communities in Southern India prefer marriage within a circle of
close relatives, usually between a man and the daughter of his elder sister, or between the children
of brothers.  Such consanguineous marriages are getting increasingly rare because suitable
grooms are difficult to find.  Another characteristic of Indian kinship systems is the variation in
their prohibition against marrying partners who belong to the same village.  In the language of the
kinship studies, such communities who marry outside their own village are called "village
exogamous."  In Karnataka State, where these data are from, the northern districts show a
tendency towards village exogamy, while in the southern districts the majority do not prefer it and
may even have prohibitions against it.  Such preferences and prohibitions are prescribed by the
customs of the community and are exogenous to the choices of households who may suffer social
sanctions by violating them.
Getting one's daughter married, within these constraints, is considered an Indian parent's
primary duty; to have an older unmarried daughter is a tremendous misfortune with large social
and economic costs.  The costs of getting a daughter married, however, have been steadily rising
in real terms across the Indian sub-continent.  In Karnataka State dowries have been increasing
substantially for several decades (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1991) and dowries in these data
average six times the annual income of a family.  There are several possible reasons why dowries
in India may have increased, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine them 8. My focus
here is on wedding celebrations, and in particular on the narrow question of whether wedding
celebrations are, at least partly, driven by a desire for higher social rank.
Every wedding requires a minimum level of expenditure that depends upon norms in the
community.  A basic celebration may help maintain one's stature within the village, but a lavish
wedding represents something else.  If you spend more than what is expected this provides the
8 For more on this subject,  see Caldwell  et. al (1988),  Rao(1993),  Raheja  (1995) and Kapadia  (1999).
7village with new information that helps them update their perception of your social status. In
particular, if the bride is marrying a "prestigious" groom, either because he is rich or well
educated, then this marriage alliance has status benefits for the wife's  family. However, a lavish
wedding without some "real" change in status may simply give people the impression that the
spender is extravagant.
Thus, if families are rational, then this extra money should only be spent when there is new
information to communicate.  If there is nothing to show off it would not be rational for a father
to spend anything beyond the minimum (maintenance level) expenditure required to fulfill his
social obligations.  Furthermore, even if the bride were marrying a rich groom there would be no
new information to communicate to the village if everyone in the village already knew that the
groom was rich.  The very existence of the marriage alliance provides enough information for the
village to update its opinion on the social standing of the bride's family.  Therefore, lavish
weddings would only make sense when the bride is marrying a prestigious groom and when the
village has no information about the groom and his family.
The variations in village exogamy provide us with a way to translate this point into a
testable hypothesis.  When marriage rules prohibit partners from the same village from getting
married, then the bride family's home village will not know much about the groom's  family. On
the other hand if brides and grooms from the same village customarily marry each other, then the
village should have very good information on the groom's family.  Thus, if lavish weddings serve
as a means of increasing status, it is only when the groom is a high status "catch" from another
village that we should observe particularly lavish weddings.
This hypothesis will be tested by estimating a multivariate regression of wedding
celebration expenses on the characteristics of the groom and bride and their families, the number
of alternate partners in the marriage market, and whether the sub-caste that the family belongs to
practices village exogamy 9. I will interact the village exogamy variable with the education and
wealth of the groom. If these interaction terms are positive we can infer that it is only when
grooms are educated and wealthy, i.e. "prestigious," and from an outside village -- resulting in a
lack of information about them in the bride's village -- that marriage expenses are significantly
higher.  This would support the hypothesis that lavish celebrations are a signal of improved social
status -- communicating new information about mobility via a costly action.
9 Note that  the village  exogamy  variable  measures  the customary  practices  prevalent  in  the community  to
which  the responding  household  belongs. This  can be treated  as exogenous  to the dowry  and wedding
celebration  decisions  since  they are unlikely  to change  in the short  term.
8Wealth will be measured by whether the families possess any land since about 40 per cent
of the households are landless. To measure the human capital of the husband and wife we use
their years of schooling and their ages at marriage.  Alternatives in the marriage market are
measured by the date of the marriage (to capture exogenous trends), and the ratio of the number
of women to the number men at marriageable ages (defined as women aged 10-19/ men aged 20-
29) measured at the year of the marriage for the bride's home district.  In addition to these
variables I also include dummies for whether the family is Muslim or belongs to a disadvantaged
or "Scheduled" caste.
Data and Results
The sample consists of 800 households randomly chosen from five districts spread across
North and South Karnataka State.  Seven villages from each district were randomly chosen and
twenty households then randomly selected from each village. The marriage data that are
employed in this paper were collected retrospectively from the married women in the sample.
About a third of the sample did not have any ever-married women of reproductive age and
therefore did not answer the women's questions.  Of those that did have eligible women, many
did not provide complete answers to the retrospective marriage questions, forcing us to drop them
from the analysis.  After eliminating about ten outliers, we are left with a sample of about 300
women spread across the five districts.  There are no significant differences between this sub-
sample and the complete sample for those questions that were answered by all the households.
Table 1 reports summary statistics from the survey data.  The average wedding celebration
expenses are about 3,000 rupees, 11 per cent as large as the average dowry which is 26,000
rupees.  Average schooling levels for men are 4.3 years and 2.9 years for women.  The average
age at marriage for men is about 25 years and 17 years for women.  The mean marriage took
place in 1980, with a standard deviation of 8.4, showing that the marriages span a fairly long
time.  Over this period, the average marriage ratio is 1.13 indicating a surplus of women in the
marriage market.  About 9 per cent of the sample is Muslim and 22 per cent belong to scheduled
castes.  Finally, 68 per cent of the households customarily practice village exogamy.
Table 2 reports estimates for the wedding celebration OLS regressions.  Looking at the
regression with no interactions, we see that grooms with land have celebrations that are
statistically significant and about 1,400 rupees higher than landless grooms.  Families that belong
to sub-castes that practice village exogamy have marriage expenses about 1,500 rupees higher
than those who marry within the village.  The results of the interaction effects between village
exogamy and the wealth and education of the husband are also consistent with the hypothesis
9presented above.  Note also that village exogamy interacted with whether the groom's family has
land increases wedding expenses by 2,600 rupees and is significant at the five per cent level.
Similarly an additional year of groom's schooling in families that practice exogamy increases
marriage expenses by about 280 rupees.  Thus, groom quality significantly matters only for those
families practicing village exogamy, where the bride's village has no knowledge of the groom's
familyl°.  These results are therefore consistent with the notion that wedding celebrations are
driven by a desire to provide information about the bride family's  enhanced social status.
3. On Festivals" 1:
Festivals are also centrally important to the lives of Indians (Fuller 1992). Weddings may
cost more, but they occur only two or three times in the lifetime of a household head, while
festivals take place every few months. Festivals are different from marriages in that they are
collective behaviors where everyone celebrates an event simultaneously. A description of the first
time I saw a village festival might be instructive: My team and I had spent several days in a
village interviewing poor families from the potter caste.  On the sixth day we were warned that it
would be "difficult to find people in their homes tomorrow because they will all be at
Mariamma's 12 festival." When we arrived the next morning the village had been transformed
beyond recognition.  The women had put on gold and silver jewelry and had jasmine flowers in
their hair.  There were colorful fragrant garlands strewn on poles around the village and on the
pillars of the local temple, along with festive decorations and balloons.  Two loudspeakers tied to
the temple's roof blared film songs. And then, at about 10 in the morning, the procession began.
It was led by a group of traditional musicians by a followed a brightly painted bullock cart
carrying an image of the goddess, swathed in silk, gold and flowers and tended by two priests.
Immediately behind the bullock cart was a group of about ten important looking men and women
followed by hordes of dancing children. I asked some people in the crowd who these important
looking people were and was told that they were from the families who had made the largest
contributions and had helped organize the celebrations.  The festival was obviously a very
'° The village  exogamy  effect  could also occur  because  husbands  from  outside  the village  would  increase
the size of the wedding  party  due  to the greater  number  of potential  guests  who  may have  to be invited.
However,  the interaction  effects  do not necessarily  follow  from  this explanation  and are far more  consistent
with  a signaling  motive.
" This  section  is derived  from  Rao (forthcoming).
2 A local village  goddess.
10expensive event entirely financed by voluntary contributions; and all the contributions, whether
small or big, were made public at an auspicious time when the Temple Committee which
organized the event announced them on loudspeakers.
Sociologists since Durkheim (1912) have argued that collective celebrations serve an
important function by providing occasions when communities reify their group identity.  Turner
(1982), for instance, describes festivals as "generally connected with expectable culturally shared
events."  He suggests that when a social group celebrates a particular event it "celebrates itself'
by "manifesting in symbolic form what it conceives to be its essential life."  Thus, festivals may
serve to build social cohesion by reinforcing ties within a community.  Furthermore, by providing
a specific time and place within which families can demonstrate their commitment to be
responsible members of the village community, and compete for status with others, they provide a
socially sanctioned arena for publicly observable action. By providing a space where everyone
can view everyone else's behavior they also generate "common knowledge'3" and help solve the
coordination problems inherent in collective action Chwe (1998).  In this sense they help build
the capacity for collective action  1 4.  Thus, at the village level, festivals enhance social cohesion
and build trust while providing an arena in which families can maintain and enhance their social
status.
The data I have are not adequate to study the relationship between festivals and social
cohesion at the village level. Therefore in the statistical analysis I focus on a household level
analysis of some of the relationships discussed above.  In particular I look at the determinants and
effects of festival expenditures.  Are they driven by private motives, or are they better thought of
as altruistic contributions towards a Public Good? Are households that spend more money on
festivals held in higher esteem by their peers? Does festival participation have real economic
returns? It is possible that families spend money on festivals for no other reason than pure
entertainment particularly in rural areas with limited access to movie theatres and television sets.
But if festivals were pure entertainment, expenditures on them should not generate any other
returns.
To test these hypotheses I regress a household's festival expenditures against various
household characteristics including the household head's age, the number of adults and children
in the family, the head's education, the land owned by the household in the past and the present,
13 A definition  of a game where  all players  know  the structure  of the game,  know  that the other  players
know  it, know  that others  know that  they know it, and so on. See Osborne  and Rubenstein  (1994) for  a
more  precise  definition.
14 Or what is, now, often  called Social  Capital  (Woolcock  and Narayan,2000).
11and the household's income. I also include  the number  of girls in the family  who are of
marriageable  age. If their presence  raises  festival  expenditures  it is consistent  with the notion  that
they are being  put on "display"  to find good spouses  indicating  that festivals  provide  an
opportunity  to communicate  information  for private  gain. Finally,  in order to see if festival
expenditures  are driven  by demonstration  effects,  I include  the festival  expenditure  of the
neighboring  household  as an explanatory  variable,  as well as a set of village dummy  variables.
In addition  to analyzing  the determinants  of festival  expenditures  I also examine  whether
festival  expenditures  generate  social  and economic  returns. I examine  two types of returns - the
family's social  status, and a household  specific  index  of the unit prices  for food faced  by the
family. The social status  variable  is constructed  by asking  each family in the village  about  their
sense  of the respect  and social  standing  accorded  to other families  in the village. This is coded
into  a measure  with four levels,  a score of 1 denoting  the lowest  level of social  standing  and 4
denoting  the highest' 5.
The unit food price index  requires  some  explanation' 6. In the process  of doing fieldwork  I
noticed  that there  was a large  variation  in the unit prices  charged  for food to different  members  of
the village. The primary  reason  for this were quantity  discounts  since  many  of the families  were
severely  liquidity  constrained  and were compelled  to purchase  food once a week on payday. The
fieldwork  revealed  that households  which had good social  relationships  were able to get around
this by forming  shopping  clubs that would  buy food in bulk and then distribute  it among  the
members. Some  well-regarded  individuals  were able  to get food on credit from the shopkeepers
that again  permitted  them  to get around liquidity  constraints. Thus, socially  well-connected
households  seemed  to suffer  less from high prices. On the other hand,  households  who did not
have good social  relationships  faced  markups  of between 15-40  per cent on their food purchases.
To get a summary  measure  of the variation  in unit  prices  across  households,  I construct  a
Laspeyres  price index  which used the prices  and quantities  purchased  by the median  household  as
a base to calculate  price variations,  for a basket  of goods,  for everyone  in the sample. With  this
method,  the median  household's  index  number  is 100;  and a household  with an index  of 200
faces  prices  that are double  the sample  median.
The social status and price index  variables  will  be regressed  against  festival  expenditures",
the household  head's  age, the number  of adults  and children  in the family, the head's  education,
15 The  social  status  regressions  will  be estimated  with  an ordered  Probit  regression.
1 6A detailed  analysis  of this  can  be found  in Rao  (2000).
17 Festival  expenditures  will  be treated  as an  endogenous  variable  using  instrumental  variables  (IV)  with  the
number  of marriageable  daughters  and  the  expenditures  of neighbors  as  excluded  variables.
12the land owned  by the household  in the past and  the present,  and the household's  income,  along
with a set of village  dummy  variables.
Data and Statistical  Analysis
The data used in this paper  are from a census  survey  of an endogamous  sub-caste  of potters
spread across  three villages,  Halli, Beedu  and Ooru  8, located  within 70 miles of each other  also
the state of Karnataka. Only  20 per cent of the adults  in this community  actually  practice
pottery,  and most are day laborers  with small-scale  farming  and silk rearing  the other major
activities. Halli and Ooru are multi-caste  villages  located  within commutable  distances  of large
towns. Beedu,  a village  consisting  entirely  of potters,  is located  in a "forward"  district  with
relatively  good schools  and a long  tradition  of providing  basic  social services.
Table 3 provides  some summary  statistics  about  the sample. The average  annual
household  income  is 14,471  Indian  rupees - about $1644  in PPP adjusted  US dollars  ($482  at the
exchange  rate prevalent  at the time) -a little over half of Indian  per capita  household  in PPP
dollars,  and well below  the Indian  poverty  line of 45 rupees per person  per day. The  average land
holding  is very low at 0.59 acres. Education  is also low,  with the average  maximum  schooling  of
a person  within a family at 4.54 years (the mean  years of completed  schooling  among  household
heads is much  lower at 1.6  years).  Despite  the low levels  of education  the villages  have recently
undergone  a fertility  transition  with the average  household  consisting  of 3 adults and 1.5 children.
Tables 4 shows  that festival  expenditures  rise with income indicating  that they are a
"normal"  good. They also rise with the maximum  level of education  in the family,  the number  of
young children,  and the number  of girls of marriageable  age. Thus,  we can infer  that private
incentives  are important  determining  factors. The amount  spent on festivals  by neighbors  is not
significant  indicating  that demonstration  effects  are not important. The level of expenditures
display  a fair amount  of variation  across  two of the three villages  with Beedu  having  significantly
lower levels  of festival expenditures  than Halli,  the omitted  category. This is despite  the fact that
the households  in all three  villages in this sample  belong  to the same  endogamous  sub-caste  and
therefore  observe  the same  religious  and ritual calendar. This suggests  that the private incentives
18 The  names  of  the villages  have  been changed.
13driving  festival  expenditures  may  differ  from community  to community  for reasons  other  than
social custom.
If households  derive  private benefits  from festivals,  what are they? To examine  this
consider  Table 5 which presents  results  of OLS  and Instrumental  Variable  (IV) regressions  of the
price index. Four different  sets of regressions  are shown. Table 5(a) is an OLS  regressions  with
festival expenditures  included,  5(c) is the same  as 5(a) but includes  an interaction  term between
festival  expenditures  and income. Table 5(b) and (d) follow  the same  pattern as 5(a) and (c) but
present  IV estimates. Since  these households  are  below the Indian  poverty  line and spend  62 per
cent of their incomes  on food,  including  income  as a regressor  should  control  quantity  discount
effects. Yet, income  does not have  significant  effects in any of the four regressions. This is
because  it is highly  correlated  with the number  of adults  in the family  that in turn is correlated
with lower prices  because  large families  are compelled  to purchase  food in larger quantities.  An
additional  adult  in the family  reduces  the price index  by more  than 2 points in the OLS
regressions.
Furthermore  an additional  acre in the size  of the father's  plot of land  reduces  prices  by 0.6
points. However,  conditional  on the land owned  by the father, current  land  holdings  do not affect
the price index. Since  there  has been  a rather  large  net loss of land in this community  over the
last  twenty  years, this result suggests  that the reputation  of the family  - indicated  by how  much
land  the family  used to own  - is far more  important  in accessing  social  networks  than current  land
holdings.
Most importantly,  higher  festival  expenditures  are negatively  correlated  with the price
index. The effect seems  to be stronger  for poorer  households.  Looking  at the interaction  between
income  and festival  in Table 5(d), a 1000  rupee  increase  in annual  festival  expenditures  reduces
the price index  by 6.2 points at the median  income. This effect is reduced  to 5.7 points at the
75th percentile  income  level, and increases  to 6.67 points  for incomes  at the 25th percentile. This
is consistent  with the hypothesis  that festival  expenditures  have  an effect on prices independent  of
the other  measured  household  attributes  by providing  a social  return  to a family. Thus,  higher
festival  expenditures,  perhaps  by increasing  a family's  ability  to tap into social  networks,  seem  to
give  a household  greater  access  to lower food  prices.
Table  6 presents  Ordered  Probit estimates  of the determinants  of social  status.  In order
to ease interpretation,  the results  are presented  as the effect of a marginal  change  of an
independent  variable  on the standard  deviation  of the status variable. Neither  current  nor past
land has an impact  on status. However,  controlling  for wealth,  families  with more income  have
higher  social  status in the IV specifications.  This suggests  that a family  with greater  liquidity  and
14a steady  job that produces  a high and predictable  income,  is valued  possibly  because it is able to
provide  a buffer  against  risk.  Annual festival  expenditures  are independently  associated  with
higher  social status and, once  again, festival  expenditures  interacted  with income  result in lower
status.  Looking  at the IV estimates  in Table 6(d), at the median income  a 1000  rupee increase  in
festival  expenditures  places  the family  at a status  level  that is 0.39 standard  deviations  higher.
Even  if one does not believe  in the ability  of IV estimates  to establish  causal  connections,  it is
clear that festival  expenditures  and social status  are strongly  associated  with one another.  This is
consistent  with the notion  that festivals  serve as arenas  where social  status is maintained  and
enhanced.
4. Conclusion
The evidence  presented  in this paper  suggests  that publicly  observable  celebrations,  such as
weddings  and festivals,  play an important  role in the lives  of the poor by serving as arenas  where
reputations  are maintained  and enhanced. They provide  an opportunity  for families  to
communicate  information  about  their mobility,  on their willingness  to be "good" members  of the
village,  and on their willingness  to participate  in webs  of obligation. This takes on a crucial  role
in the Indian  context  where social  networks  and relationships  play a central  role in shaping
people's identities. They  are also extremely  important  as elements  of strategies  to cope with risk
and poverty. Thus, it is perfectly  within  reason  that Indian  villagers  spend as much  as they do on
public  celebrations.
However,  to the extent that these celebrations  are status  competitions,  driven  by a need  to
signal  changes  in mobility,  they may be "wasteful"  in the sense  that they take resources  away
from investments  in schooling,  health and agriculture.  But a judgement  of "waste" should  be
rendered  with care because  it may reflect  a model  of welfare  derived  from Western  notions of
individualism.  To the extent to which celebrations  and their expenditures  maintain  identities,
reify social  relationships,  fulfill obligations,  or represent  "investments  in social capital,"  they are
indeed  productive  expenditures  within  this cultural  context.
This has important  implications  for development  policy. Some  sources of economic
growth,  such  as market-driven  improvements  in urban employment,  may reduce  a family's
dependence  upon its traditional  networks. This could  reduce  the incentives  to maintain  these
networks  and thus possibly  reduce participation  in village  festivals.  This would,  in turn, adversely
influence  the traditional  mechanisms  of maintaining  social  cohesion  within  a village,  which may
reduce  its capacity  for collective  action and consequently  have  a negative  effect on well being
15(Narayan  and Pritchett,  1999). On the other  hand, as individuals  become  economically  better off
their need  to demonstrate  their mobility  to their peers  may increase  the size  of wedding
celebrations  and other forms  of conspicuous  consumption. Thus,  economic  development  may
reduce  social cohesion  and trust while  increasing  status displays,  moving  celebrations  away from
their role as participatory  events  towards  an emphasis  on their function  as competitive  games.
This could  indeed  be wasteful.
One possible  way  to avoid  this outcome  is to construct  development  mechanisms  that
improve  well-being  in a manner  that does not privilege  individual  over collective  action.  If an
intervention  is more  participatory,  requiring  collective  decisions  and collective  management,  it
would maintain  community  cohesion  and perhaps  have  more equitable  benefits. There  are
several  mechanisms  currently  in place  that are attempting  such strategies,  Micro-Finance
programs  and Social  Funds for instance,  but they have  not been  adequately  studied  to determine  if
they  retain and perhaps  even build  a community's  capacity  for collective  action. Further  research
will  have to be conducted  to see whether  communities  targeted  by such interventions  move  away
from conspicuous  to what could  be called "cooperative"  consumption:  celebrations  that are less
about  showing  off than they are about  maintaining  links across  families,  building  bonds,  and
sustaining  webs  of obligation.
16Table 1
Wedding Celebration - Means and Standard Deviations
Variable  N=297  Mean  Standard Deviation
Net Dowry Payment  (1994 Rupees)  26308.640  238069.000
Wedding Celebration Expenses  (1994 Rupees)  2898.921  374.336
Marriage Squeeze Ratio  1.130  0.146
Year of Marriage  80.362  8.370
Wife's Schooling (Years)  2.942  4.019
Husband's Schooling (Years)  4.253  4.533
Muslim  (Dummy)  0.093  0.290
Scheduled Caste/Tribe  (Dummy)  0.222
Husband Owned Land at Marriage  (Dummy)  0.603
Wife's Owned Land at Marriage  (Dummy)  0.610
Husband's Age at Marriage  24.778  4.252
Wife's Age at Marriage  17.123  3.464
Village Exogamous (Dummy)  0.680
ii  Bidar (Dummy)  0.230
South Kanara (Dummy)  0.212
Kodagu (Dummy)  0.201
Kolar (Dummy)  0.114
Mysore (Dummy)  0.241
Monthly Transfers from Husband's Family  26.000  291.514
Emergency Transfers from Husband's Family in  32.000  293.584
the Last Four Years
17Table 2
Weddine  Celebration  Expenses - OLS Regressions
(Robust standard errors)
Variables  Weddinz  Celebration  ExDenses
No Interactions  With Interactions
l  ______________________________  Coefficient  JtL  Coefficient  J  L
Marriage Squeeze Ratio  -15595.980  0.87  -15496.910  0.92
Year of Marriage  -140.266  2.52  -154.520  2.57
Wife's Schooling (Yrs)  -177.396  0.84  -175.045  0.82
Husband's Schooling (Yrs)  267.253  1.10  59.506  0.33
Muslim  840.806  0.48  1119.523  0.71
Scheduled Caste/Tribe  *  -82.179  0.12  131.148  0.15
Wife's Land at Marriage - Dummy  80.108  0.09  434.018  0.56
Husband's Land at Marriage - Dummy  1393.610  2.12  -371.459  0.42
Husband's Age at Marriage  12.333  0.19  -12.152  0.19
Wife's Age at Marriage  171.708  2.14  199.380  2.25
Village Exogamous  1537.037  2.76  -1043.381  1.08
Exogamous x H. Schooling  ---  --  276.141  1.84
Exogamous x H. Land?  ---  --  2577.297  2.28
Bidar  494.008  0.42  256.660  0.16
South Kanara  2152.321  0.38  2244.290  0.22
Kodagu  4280.982  3.33  4076.240  3.23
Kolar  -2279.403  2.73  -2383.694  2.83
Constant  24676.820  1.08  27369.130  1.21
F for Joint Significance  6.52  5.58
R-Squared  0.21  0.23
18Table 3
Festival Expenditures - Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Variable  (N=123)  Mean  Std. Deviation
Annual Festival Expenditures (1994  rupees)  1972.72  1305.13
Annual Income  14,471.31  14,143.28
Father's Land Holdings in Acres  1.16  3.89
Land in Acres  0.59  1.22
Age of Household Head  45.27  13.07
Maximum years of Schooling  within the family  4.54  4.06
Number of Family Members older than 16  3.10  1.37
Children Aged 10-16  0.65  0.82
Girls Aged 10-16  0.31  0.53
Children Less than 10  1.09  1.17
Annual F-i  84334.09  5441.01
Average Festival Expenditures of Neighbors  1951.51  902.08
Number of Invitations for Meals  1.55  1.51
Price Index  100.37  14.33
Beedu Village  0.25
Halli Village  0.44
Ooru Village  0.30
19Table 4
Determinants of Festival Expenditures
OLS  with Huber-White  Standard  Errors  (Itl  in parenthesis)
Variable
Beedu Village  -0.9679
(2.6)
Ooru Village  -0.3659
Father's Land Holdings  0.0127
(0.7)
Annual Income/1000  (1992  Rupees)  0.0186
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _(2  .1 )
Land in Acres  0.1432
_  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _(1  .1 )
Number of Adults  0.1147
.__  _ __  _ _ _ __  _ _ __  _ _ _ __  _ __  . .(1.1)
Number of Kids 10-16  years  0.0003
(0.0)
Number of Kids < 10 years  0.1765
(1.7)
Max Yrs. of Schooling  0.0795
.__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (2  .9  )
Age of Head  0.0030
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _(0  .4 )
Number of Girls 10-16  Years  0.6548
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _2  .2 )
Festival Expenditures of Next Door  -0.0993
Neighbors/1000  (1.0)
Constant  1.1033
._  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (2  .2  )
Adjusted R-Squared  0.42
20Table  5
Determinants of Price Index - OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors  (Itl in Darenthesis)
Variable  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)
Festival Expenditures/1000 (1992 rupees)  -1.8102  -2.8529
(1.7)  (2.2)
Festival Expenditures x  Income  ---  ---  0.0595
(1.0)
Festival Expenditures (Predicted)  -5.5314  ---  -7.7058
(1.8)  (2.2)
Festival Expenditures (Predicted) x Income  ---  ---  0.1220
__________________________________________________  _____________  (1.8)
Beedu Village  5.5849  3.5493  4.4174  1.1021
(2.1)  (1.0)  (1.5)  (0.3)
Ooru  Village  1.5151  0.0019  1.243  -0.7106
(0.4)  (0.0)  (0.4)(02
Annual Income/1000 (1992 rupees)  -0.0591  0.0581  -0.3212  -0.5175
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0.6)  (0.6)  (1 0)  (1.3)
Father's  Land Holdings  -0.6589  -0.6644  -0.6355  -0.6214
(4.7)  (4.1)  (4.6)  (3.8)
Land in Acres  0.9627  1.9351  0.6652  2.0219
(0.9)  (1.7L  (0.6)  (1.8)
Number of Adults  -2.6409  -2.9491  -2.4313  -2.4876
_ _  _  ~~~~~~(1-8)  (1.8)  (1.6)  (1.5)
Number of Kids 10-16  years  0.7638  1.9119  1.0651  2.4375
(0.4)  (0.8)  (0.5)  (1.1)
Number of Kids < 10 years  0.6116  1.0664  0.7804  1.2709
(0.6)  (0.8)  (0.7)  (1.0)
Maximum Years of Schooling  0.0068  0.0383  0.0615  0.1939
(0.0)  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.4)
Age of Head  0.0262  0.0322  0.0337  0.0319
__0O.3)  (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.3)
constant  106.2416  112.0663  109.0430  118.7900
(22.0)  (20.5)  (20.8)  (17.4)
Adi usted R-Sauared  0.17  0.21  0.18  0.23
21Table  6
Determinants  of Social Status  - Ordered  Probit
Coefficients  report effect of unit change  in X on standard  deviation change in  y *
dzl in  parenthesis)
Variable  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)
OLS  IV  OLS  IV
No  No  With  With
Interactions  Interactions  Interactions  Interactions
Festival Expenditures/1000 (1992 rupees)  0.1723  0.4289
(1.8)  (3.4)
Festival Expenditures x  Income  ---  -0.0165
(3.1)
Festival Expenditures (Predicted)  ---  0.3094  ---  0.5753
(1.0)  (1.9)
Festival Expenditures  (Predicted) x Income  ---  ---  ---  -0.0155
(3.4)
Beedu Village  -0.0522  -0.0233  0.3151  0.3216
;_________________________________________  (0.2)  (0.1)  (1.0)  (0.9)
Ooru Village  0.0432  0.0570  0.2172  0.1708
(0.2)  (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.6)
Annual Income/1000 (1992  rupees)  -0.0122  -0.0157  0.0725  0.0669
(1.4)  (1.4)  (2.6)  (2.6)
Father's Land Holdings  0.0084  -0.0037  0.0015  -0.0095
l__________________________________________  (0.3)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.4)
Land in Acres  -0.0560  -0.1304  0.0129  -0.1542
l______________________________________________  (0.5)  (1.1)  (0.1)  (0.4)
Number of Adults  0.2121  0.2223  0.1083  0.1424 ! _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(2.1)  (2.2)  (I. l)  (1.5)
Number of Kids 10-16  years  0.0042  0.0438  -0.0764  -0.0371
(0.0)  (0.3)  (0.6)  (0.2)
Number of Kids < 10 years  0.0907  0.1241  0.0347  0.0964
(0.9)  (1.2)  (0.4)  (0.9)
Maximum Years of Schooling  0.0514  0.0539  0.0348  0.0324
(1.8)  (1.6)  (1.3)  (.0)
Age of Head  0.0114  0.0926  0.0099  0.0083
(1.4)  (0.0)  (1.2)  (1.1)
Pseudo R-Squared  0.09  0.10  0.13  0.14
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